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Arne Westad's The Global Cold War (2005) was a pathbreaking study that highlighted patterns of resistance to superpower intervention in developing countries. Focusing on the Middle East, Westad notes how the rise of fundamentalist Islam in Afghanistan and Iran in the 1970s posed a challenge to the authority of both the Soviet Union and the United States. 4 Studies by Matthew Connelly and Salim Yaqub underline the surprising autonomy of Middle Eastern countries such as Algeria and Egypt and show that superpower policies were not a one-way street. Arab countries were successful in foiling superpower designs and forcing decision makers in Washington and Paris to rethink their policies. In the late 1950s, al-Nasir's regime in Egypt, for instance, was able to thwart an elaborate scheme hatched by the Eisenhower administration to create an Arab bloc that would stem the tide of Egypt's growing influence in the Arab world. Al-Nasir's skillful diplomacy convinced the U.S. government to jettison the Eisenhower Doctrine altogether. Algerian rebels proved just as resourceful when confronted with the full brunt of French rage. What they could not achieve on the battlefield they were able to get by orchestrating a sophisticated international campaign, eventually gaining the independence of Algeria not through armed struggle but rather thanks to a diplomatic revolution. In other words, the leaders of the FLN learned to use for their own ends the tools invented and practiced by European diplomats. Moreover, the Eisenhower administration decided to side with the rebels and not with France, fearing that the reputation of the United States in the Third World would be tarnished by too close an association with a colonial power. It is telling that the American fears of Afro-Asian resentment were greater than the apprehension of NATO's disintegration.
5
What is notable in all of these studies is the inventive use of American, British, French, East German, Soviet, and even Yugoslav sources to illuminate the behavior of Middle Eastern leaders and movements. With Arab diplomatic archives covering the post World War II era virtually closed, it is small wonder that scholars resort to "side-door" techniques to uncover secrets still locked in Damascus and Cairo through the use of documents in Paris, Washington, and London. Nonetheless, perhaps no other archives have proven as valuable as those in East European countries. Unlike Russian archives that are still stingy with materials, archives in the former satellite states have undergone a full liberalization. They are especially valuable for those interested in the histories of Arab regimes in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, because for a good part of the Cold War officials in those countries felt politically and ideologically closer to the Communist Bloc than the Western Bloc and were therefore more willing to divulge sensitive information to East European diplomats. The latter had also much more access to high officials and local societies than their Western counterparts. Massimiliano Trentin, by working closely with East German sources and looking into the process of modernization in the Arab world, has explained an advantage the East Germans had over the West Germans when it came to strengthening relations with Egypt, Syria, and Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s. While in the early 1960s West Germany was still a major trade partner of these countries, it could offer little in the way of advice to authoritarian regimes pursuing state-led development. East German advisors proved far more useful in providing counsel on how to devise five-year plans, organize an effective secret police, operate an efficient domestic propaganda machine, and establish a oneparty system. 7 Czech and German scholars, again turning the agency structure on its head, have shown how desperate East German and Czechoslovak officials were to use Muammar el Qaddafi's radicalism and oil riches to save their failing finances. Following the 1970s oil shock, East German politicians convinced themselves that Qaddafi would use the mountain of cash that he had amassed in his bank account to fund a billion-dollar East German export offensive in Africa and the Middle East (Qaddafi was willing to play along with that scheme for a short time). Likewise, Czechoslovak officials, always eager to support their cash-starved country by selling arms, hoped that orders from Libya would cover for the loss of the Egyptian market as Anwar Sadat increasingly drifted toward American weapon suppliers from the mid-1970s. 8 It also goes the other way around. Middle East historians have much to contribute to the field of Cold War studies as they are better equipped methodologically and linguistically to describe the motives and worldviews of Middle Eastern leaders, social groups, and states whose agency has only recently attracted the attention of Cold War historians. 3 For samples of the new "Third Worldist" Cold War historiography, see Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill 
